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Articles
Bruce MacDougall*

Consideration and Estoppel:
Problem and Panacea

In his book, The History of the Common Law of Contract, A.W.B.
Simpson demonstrates that consideration originally seems to have meant
the "matter of inducement" - the "why" of entering a promise.' He writes:
"The essence of the doctrine of consideration, then, is the adoption by the
common law of the idea that the legal effect of a promise should depend
upon the factor or factors which motivated the promise. To decide
whether a promise to do X is binding, you need to know why the promise
was made."2 In modem terms, according to Simpson, a promise which
lacks any adequate motive cannot have been serious and therefore ought
not to be taken seriously. There could have been other reasons for
enforcing a promise, such as induced reliance and detriment, but these
reasons were subsumed into one test for the actionability of all promises:
the requirement of good consideration. Consideration was simply a
reason to enforce an obligation or a promise. It was a moral justification
or legitimisation for enforcing an obligation: Why it was right that it
should be enforced.
This paper examines how our conception of consideration has become
much less fluid than this original, simple approach. The paper proceeds
to look at how the rigidity of consideration has resulted in a corresponding
inability of contract law to adapt to accomodate many obligation-creating
situations. One result has been a phenomenal growth in the use and scope
of equitable estoppel, to the point where recent Australian jurisprudence
contemplates its use as a means of generating future obligations. It will
be submitted that a better approach would be to allow the doctrine of
consideration to return to something close to its original justification, thus
permitting the law of contract to deal with most of the situations now
being treated as solvable only by estoppel. At the same time, courts
should acknowledge and elaborate on their role in making contracts, in
imposing obligations for the future on parties where, in the view of the
court, the balancing of interests justifies such a result.
* Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. The author wishes to thank Joel Bakan for
his helpful comments on this paper.
1.See Simpson, The History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of
Assumpsit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) atp. 320. See also: P.S. Atiyah, The Rise
and Fallof Freedom of Contract(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
2. Ibid., at p. 321.
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I. Consideration:Justificationsand Problems
Since its origin as a moral justification for recognising obligations, other
supposedly amoral justifications for the doctrine of consideration have
been developed. One obvious one is the limit that a requirement of
consideration places on the number of cases related to promises and
reliance that might otherwise come before the court. A gratuitous promise
will not be enforced in the absence of consideration so there is little point
in litigating. Trivial or casual promises are thus excluded from the law of
contract, as are promises involving friends or family. I
Another justification for consideration is that it promotes the notion of
the bargain as being central to the enforcement of obligations. The idea
that someone could enforce an obligation of another to deliver or do
something without giving anything in return is trivialised as unworthy of
the attention of the courts. Because consideration must flow from the
promisee, it supports the notion that one has to work oneself in order to
obtain a benefit.
A related justification for consideration is the role it can play in
ensuring fair dealing between parties. A person must get something new
in return for being forced to give or do something. Past consideration is
not sufficient by itself.' A result is that a person will not be forced to be
eternally grateful by making continued future promises on the basis of
one good deed in the past. One effect of this "rule" is the encouragement
of the generation of new activity, goods and wealth.
The fact that a court will not look at the sufficiency of consideration 5
means thatparties are treated as independent actors capable of determining
value on their own. This approach, based on the idea of formal equality,
supports the idea of the independent will and value of the individual and
encourages the use of the market rather than the courts to determine the
fairness of a deal.
Finally, there is the notion that consideration is somehow a replacement
for a formal act. Consideration can be seen as a substitute for a seal.
Gratuitous promises are easily and hastily given - often to be regretted
afterwards. Ensuring that there is an exchange introduces a formality into
the transaction, preventing enforcement of promises hastily given and
later repented.
3. E.g. Eastwoodv Kenyon (.1840), 11 Ad. &E. 438,113 E.R.482;BalfourvBalfour,[1919]
2 K.B. 571 (C.A.); Jones v Padavatton,[1969] 2 All E.R. 616 (C.A.). See generally on this
matter Charles Fried, Contractas Promise:A Theory of ContractualObligation(Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
4. Eastwood v Kenyon, supra, note 3; Dent v Bennett (1839), 4 My. & Cr. 269; 41 E.R. 105.
5. Mountford v Scott, [1974] 1 All E.R. 248, aff'd [1975] 1 All E.R. 198 (C.A.); Bolton v

Madden (1873),,LR 9 QB 55.

Consideration and Estoppel: Problem and Panacea

Far from being amoral, these justifications or rationalisations for the
doctrine of consideration reflect a view of society as an organisation
where individuals must pay their way and stand on their own feet. This
is a type of morality, a sort of laisser-faire or free-market morality, even
though the exponents of this vision of consideration may not see it as
moralistic at all. If the present justifications of consideration are viewed
as simply a manifestation of "community morality" in the law of contract,
it would be much easier to redefine the scope or nature of consideration
6
to meet today's changed community (or social or commercial) morality.
This has certainly happened elsewhere in the law of obligations, even in
the law of contract. 7
Given the insistence on the existence of consideration before an
obligation will be contractually binding,' it is somewhat surprising that
courts find so many ways around the requirement. Or, perhaps, it is
because of the rigid formalism of the requirement of consideration that it
is necessary that courts find methods of circumvention. Many
"refinements" on consideration are better seen as methods to circumvent
its requirement. The notion that past consideration can be valid
consideration, so long as it was given at the request of the promisor who
expects to give something in exchange in the future,9 can be seen as a way
to minimise the impact that the rule against past consideration will have.
While the modification does facilitate transactions spread over time, it
also undermines the notion that something new should be given in
exchange for a fresh promise. The rule that a court does not look to the
adequacy of consideration further substantiates the view that consideration

6. See also D. Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power"(1982),41 Maryland
Law Rev. 563; and A. A.Leff, "Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause"
(1967), 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485.
7. See Harty v Kreutziger (1978), 9 B.C.L.R. 166 (C.A.); Tilden Rent-a-Carv Clendenning
(1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400 (Ont. C.A.). Classifications are essential in the law, including the
law of contract. However, those classifications must remain flexible. See Arthur Allen Leff,
"Contract as Thing" (1970), 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131.
8. See, e.g., the textwriters Treitel, Law of Contract,7th ed., (London: Stevens, 1987), ch. 3;
Lindgren, Carter and Harland, ContractLaw in Australia (Sydney: Butterworths, 1986);
Fridman, Law of Contract(Toronto: Carswell, 1986), ch. 3; John Swan, "Consideration of the
Reasons for Enforcing Contracts" in Reiter and Swan, Studies in Contract Law (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1980); GilbertSteel Ltd. v University ConstructionLtd. (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d)
606 (Ont. C.A.); Combe v Combe, [1951] 2 K.B. 215 (C.A.).
9. Lampleigh vBrathwaite(1615) Hob. 105; 80 E.R. 255; Re Casey'sPatents,Stewartv Casey,
[1892] 1 Ch. 104, per Bowen LJ at pp. 115-116.
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is a mere formality - to be got round. If a peppercorn can truly be said to
be valuable consideration, then the notion of consideration as a thing of
value given in exchange for another thing or promise of value is surely
untenable.10 The peppercorn is merely a demonstration of the sincerity of
the promisee (and, indeed, of the promisor). The fact that there is a duty
owed to a third party can also, it seems, amount to consideration.II Here
again the idea of consideration being something of substantial economic
value is made a mockery. In such a situation, there is no new benefit or
detriment- there is nothing new given in exchange. The courts are simply
recognising another situation in which it is right or appropriate that a
promise be enforced. Consideration is given a legal value devoid of any
requirement of actual economic value.
There are cases that say that a modified promise will be enforceable if
something new is given in exchange for the modification. 2 That
"something new" can take the form of the old consideration being
modified in some way. So, for example, in Foot v. Rawlings, 3 the
Supreme Court of Canada accepted the view that payment by postdated
cheque was sufficiently different from an obligation to pay generally that
it could constitute new consideration for a modified promise. This
technical or artificial approach discredits the existing law of consideration
and indicates an unwillingness to face the issue of why consideration is
required in the first place. Legislators in many jurisdictions have stepped
in to do what judges refuse to do and have removed in some circumstances
4
the requirement that consideration not be past.
The development of the notion of the wholly executory contract
necessitated more qualifications to the doctrine of consideration. A
promise is sufficient to enforce another promise when there is nothing
tangible exchanged, just expectations. If this expectation is adequate
consideration then consideration must simply be a method for establishing
when and what expectations ought to be fulfilled. Any tangible exchange
element or benefit or detriment is in the future and must be of secondary
concern.
10. Handley JA uses the ability of a single peppercorn to constitute consideration as a way to
distinguish it from the way in which estoppel can work: HawkerPacificPty. Ltd. v Helicopter
CharterPty. Ltd. (1991), 22 NSWLR 298 (C.A.).
11. Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, [1979] 3 All E.R. 65 (P.C.).
12.FootvRawlings,[1963] SCR 197 (SCC); WilliamsvRoffeyBros. &Nicholls (Contractors)

Ltd., [1990] 1 All E.R. 512 (C.A.).
13. Supra, note 12.
14. JudicatureAct, R.S.A. 1980, c. J-1, s. 13(1); Law and EquityAct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 224,
s. 40; Mercantile Law Amendment Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. M-120, s. 6; Mercantile Law

Amendment Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 265, s. 16; Queen'sBench Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. Q-1, s.45(7);
JudicatureOrdinance,R.O.Y.T. 1976, c. J-1, s. 10(g); Judicature Ordinance,R.O.N.W.T.
1974, c. J-1, s. 19(g).

Consideration and Estoppel: Problem and Panacea

These are ways around consideration that operate within the doctrine
itself. These are ways in which courts have qualified the orthodox
doctrine of consideration without having to undertake a more profound
re-assessment of the doctrine. However, many of these "qualifications"
seriously undermine the accepted notion of what consideration is.
The artificiality of consideration and the intricate rules that have come
into being to qualify it not only make a mockery of the doctrine of
consideration but also hold back the development of the law of contract
as a whole. Contract has come to mean a thing which parties create; they
can only "make" a contract by using the correct ingredients, one of which
is consideration. Once created it is only possible to restructure the thing
by building another agreement or contract using the same list of ingredients.
This approach to contract makes it a relatively easy concept to analyse or
even to teach. One mixes the correct ingredients, examines the contents
and the structure, criticises any defects and then studies how it works or
what happens when it does not function properly. On this view, a contract
is something which one can point to and say: "There is a contract." 15
But what happens when one of the ingredients (for example
consideration) is not present? If there appears to be an agreement why
does it matter if one of the usual ingredients is missing or does not take
its usual form? If the parties involved agree on their roles, appear sincere
about their putative obligations, and actually respond on the assumption
that there is an agreement, why should the lack of consideration matter?
Is not the element of sincerity sufficient? Is sincerity not really the true
basis of consideration in any event?
More important, why must contract be seen as something that is
constructed? That model does not really fit many ordinary "contracts" such as vending machine or department store purchases. In those situations,
surely the most common of contracts, the parties involved can hardly be
said to be building a "thing" with their straightforward transaction. The
contract-as-construction is central to the simple business contract
negotiated between commercial parties of equal bargaining strength. It is
not very useful for analysing adhesion contracts or even complicated
business transactions.' 6 Nor is it terribly applicable where, as often
happens, parties begin to perform obligations without there being a
legally complete contract in existence. It is not very useful, in other
words, where it is difficult or impossible to pinpoint when the elements
of contract can be said to have been created - ie: what is the offer, what

15. See A. A. Leff, "Contract as Thing", supra,note 7.
16. Ibid.
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is the acceptance and where is the consideration. If there is a requirement
that all these elements be met absolutely before there is a contractually
binding obligation, then contract is a most formalistic creation. In order
to satisfy such pre-requisites, in many situations courts will engineer the
satisfaction of these requirements or bend the facts so they can fit the
17
requirement.
The law of contract has proved to be remarkably adept at recognising
a wide variety of obligations. 8 It has been capable of shaping or
absorbing or accomodating very adaptable and flexible remedies. 19 In
light of this extraordinary catholicism of contract it is peculiar that there
is an initial rigidity in the formation of contracts, in particular in the
requirement and nature of consideration.
The inability of contract to take into its ambit new situations because
of formalistic difficulties has given impetus to the development of other
legal doctrines that are more flexible and capable of being employed
where a contract is unable to be created, imposed or simply found - or at
least where this impression is given. 20 One has only to look to the
enormous growth in the law of tort, fiduciary obligations and estoppel for
examples of doctrines profiting because of the inability of the law of
2
contract to grow. 1

17. Even a writer as distinguished and orthodox as Professor Treitel acknowledges the
existence of "invented consideration": Law of Contract,supra, note 8, at p. 56. In some cases
consideration may not be required, for example for a gratuitous promise, performance of which
has been undertaken, or a gratuitous bailment. See M.A. Hickling, "Labouring with Promissory
Estoppel: A Well-Worked Doctrine Working Well?" (1983), 17 U.B.C. L. Rev. 183.
18. There is little that cannot be achieved by a contract. Many formerly illegal or immoral
contracts might now be permissible. Most regulation of contract now deals with ensuring fair
play.
19. E.g. damages, specific performance, rescission, rectification, and arguably restitution.
20. Among those who argue against this fragmentation of the law of obligations is P.S. Atiyah.
See, for example, his comments, passim, in Essays on the Law of Contract (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986).
21. See B. Reiter, "Contracts, Torts, Relations and Reliance" in Reiter and Swan, Studies in
Contract Law, supra, note 8; P. Finn, "Contract and the Fiduciary Principle" (1989), 12
U.N.S.W.L.J. 76; J.C. Shepherd, TheLawofFiduciaries(Toronto: Carswell, 1981); P.D. Finn,
Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney: Law Book Co., 1977); Meagher, Gummow and Lehane,
Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (Sydney, Butterworths, 1984) ch. 5; J. Carter, "Contract,
Restitution and Promissory Estoppel" (1989), 12 U.N.S.W.LJ. 30; P. Birks, An Introduction
to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.)
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H. Estoppel
This section of the paper examines estoppel as a device used to circumvent
the rigid requirements of consideration and the implications of that use.22
Estoppel can be a difficult subject because of the great variety of opinions
as to its nature, its scope, and its-permitted uses. There are few other
doctrines in the law which have such convoluted problems of
nomenclature.2 3 It can be agreed that an estoppel amounts to a prevention
of one party from denying the truth or validity of a particular state of facts
24
or law or both.
Estoppel is sometimes divided into common law estoppel and equitable
estoppel. 2 Common law estoppel amounts to arepresentation or assertion
of an existing or past state of facts and performs an evidentiary function.
Equitable estoppel has been, appropriately enough for an equitable
doctrine, more amorphous. It tends to relate to the future and can affect
substantive obligations. The two types of estoppels usually identified as
equitable are proprietary estoppel and promissory estoppel. The following
part of the paper sets out some of the development of estoppel, in
particular equitable estoppel. This discussion will provide a background
to the discussion of recent English, Australian and Canadian cases which
represent a major development in equitable estoppel and also raise
profound questions about the existence and scope of the requirement of
consideration in a contract.

22. On Estoppel, see other writers: P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall ofFreedom of Contract,
supra, note 1,p. 778; P. S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract,4th ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 153-156; G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract,supra, note
8, pp. 113-114; G.H. Fridman, The Law of Contract,2nd ed., supra,note 8, pp. 513-515. In the
United States, s. 90 of the Restatement uses estoppel actions to supplement the law ofcontract,
by allowing contracts to be created where there was no consideration, classically defined, but
only detriment. Grant Gilmore, in The Death of Contract (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State
University Press, 1974), concludes that s. 90 has swallowed up the bargain principle of s. 75,
i.e. estoppel has swallowed up classical contract: p. 72.
23. A good and practical treatment of the various types of estoppel is found in A. Leopold,
"Estoppel: A Practical Appraisal of Recent Developments" (1991), 7 Aust. Bar Rev. 47; See
also Keven Lindgren, "Estoppel in Contract" (1989), 12 U.N.S.W.L.J. 153.
24. The standard work on estoppel is Spencer Bower and Turner, The LawRelating to Estoppel
by Representation (London: Butterworths, 1977), a work now quite out of date and never
particularly good for Canadian jurisprudencein any event.
25. A more usual historical division is into estoppel by record, estoppel by deed and estoppel
inpais.For a treatment of the development of estoppel more detailed than is possible here, see
chapter I1 of P. Perell's book, The Fusion of Law andEquity (Toronto: Butterworths, 1990).
On estoppel by convention see T. Brettel Dawson, "Estoppel and Obligation: the modem role
of estoppel by convention" (1989), 9 Legal Stud. 16. See, generally, M. Dorney, "The New
Estoppel" (1991), 7 Aust. Bar Rev. 19.
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1. The English Development of Estoppel
The source of many of the ideas about estoppel (and its relation to
contract), both traditional and reformist, is Jordenv. Money26 . There, the
question arose of whether one party could be held to her stated intention
not to claim on a bond and warrant of authority against another party. The
majority of the House of Lords found that she could not.
The Lord Chancellor agreed with the submission that there was "a
principle equally of law and of equity" that "if a person makes any false
representation to another, and that other acts upon that false representation,
the person who has made it shall not afterwards be allowed to set up that
what he said was false, and to assert the real truth in place of the falsehood
which has so misled the other. That is a principle of universal
application..."2 7 The Lord Chancellor added that it was not necessary that
the party making the representation should know that it was false. Then,
and this was crucial in the subsequent development of estoppel, the Lord
Chancellor added: "I am bound to state my view of the case; I think that
that doctrine does not apply to a case where the representation is not a
representation of fact, but a statement of something which the party
intends or does not intend to do." ' 8 The Lord Chancellor said that "...in the
case of what is something future, there is no reason for the application of
the rule, because the parties have only to say, 'Enter into a contract,' and
then all difficulty is removed." 29
Lord St. Leonards ° agreed that the arrangement in the case was not "a
contract in the proper sense of the word."'3' He disagreed, however, with
the majority of the court that in order for a person to avail himself of any
statement "in a case like the present" there must be involved a
misrepresentation of fact: "It is my misfortune not to agree in that view
of the matter. I do not consider that that can be the case. I think it is utterly
immaterial whether it is a misrepresentation of fact, as it actually existed,
or a misrepresentation of intention to do, or to abstain from doing, an act

26. (1854), 5 H.L.C. 185; 10 E.R. 868.
27. Ibid., p. 210.
28. Ibid., pp. 214-215.
29. Ibid., p. 216. The doctrine of estoppel by representation is to a large extent traceable to
Jordenv Money. See M. Dorney, "The New Estoppel", supra,note 25. Lord Brougham came
to the same conclusion as Lord Chancellor but only after admitting that "this case has given
me, as I believe it has the rest of your Lordships, no small anxiety in the course of the
argument..."
30. According to Gareth H. Jones' item on Edward Sugden (Baron St. Leonards) in A.W.B.
Simpson, ed, BiographicalDictionaryof Common Law, (London: Butterworths, 1984), "A
bon mot of Sugden on BROUGHAM has survived: 'If the Lord Chancellor only knew a little
law, he would know a little of everything!'." (p. 496).
31. Jorden v Money, supra, note 26, p. 240.
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which would lead to the damage of the party whom you thereby induced
to deal in marriage or in purchase, orin anything of that sort, upon the faith
of that representation. 3 2 Lord St. Leonards said that the principle was
simply that a person should not be allowed, either in a court of equity or
in a court of law, to misrepresent the stated circumstances in which
property exists so as to deceive parties and induce them to rely upon the
person's statement.
Since Jorden v. Money, there has been a gradual re-emergence of
primacy for the views of Lord St. Leonards by use of other types of
estoppel than estoppel by representation. What has developed at the same
time is a concern and deference for the sanctity of contract, in particular
for the doctrine of consideration. The problem has been how to preserve
the role of consideration and contract and at the same time reach the logic
of Lord St. Leonards that misrepresentation of intention, when relied
upon, should not be tolerated.33
One area where statements or assertions about intention can be
enforced orreliance protected outside of situations where the requirements
for a contract have been fully satisfied is in the cases now grouped under
the name proprietary estoppel. There, one party is under the impression
created by the second party, that the second party has agreed to give the
first an interest of some kind in real property belonging to the second. If
the first party relies on that belief to the knowledge of the second and to
the detriment of the first, the second will be estopped or prevented from
denying the validity of the belief of the first party. The mechanism for
achieving this result can be the giving by the court of a property interest
of the second party to the first. 14

32. Ibid., p. 248.
33. Of course this raises the question of whether contract is even about intention at all or
whether it is a means of protecting induced reliance. The failure to view contract as meaning
the lattermay be seen as another reason for the need forand rise ofequitable estoppel. If contract
is merely about guaranteeing intention, then its focus is the promise - and reliance is only of
peripheral importance. See P.S. Atiyah, "Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations", ch.
3 of Essays on Contract,supra,note 20.

34. The principle of proprietary estoppel was clearly stated (though not named) in Dillwyn v
Llewelyn (1862), 4 DeGF&J 517; 45 ER 1285. John Swan suggests that cases like Dilfiyn v

Liewelyn must be analysed in terms of estoppel only if one thinks it is necessary to find
exceptions to the doctrine of consideration to solve all problems that can arise. That is true if

Dilfisyn v Liewelyn were decided today, but its significance is now only as a historical marker
in the development of estoppel (whatever the judges at the time may have thought). See also
Ramsden v Dyson (1866), L.R.1 H.L. 129.
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The case that heralded an even greater role for estoppel was Central
London PropertyTrust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., 35where Denning
J. used the hitherto little known cases of Hughes v. MetropolitanRailway
Co.36 and Birmingham andDistrictLand Company v. London andNorth
Western Railway Co. 37to formulate a doctrine which has become known
as promissory estoppel." In the High Trees case, where the question arose
as to the enforceability of a promise by a lessor that the lessee could pay
a reduced rent, Denning J. said that Jorden v. Money was no longer a
complete statement of the law. The law had not been "standing still" since
Jorden v. Money. Denning J. pointed to "a series of decisions" wherein
a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and
which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to
be acted on by the person to whom it was made, and which was in fact so
acted on. In such cases, according to Denning J., the courts said that the
promise mustbe honoured. In the cases to which Denning J.referred, "the
court held the promise to be binding on the party making it even though
under the old common law it might be difficult to find any consideration
for it. The courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in
damages for the breach of such a promise, but they have refused to allow
'39
the party making it to act inconsistently with it."
Denning J. raised the issue of the conflict with consideration and.
contract. The difference, according to Denning J. was that there was no
cause of action in damages for breach of the obligation established by
estoppel. It is not clear whether at this stage Denning J. meant that there
was no cause of action at all or if it was just damages that were precluded.
35. [1947] 1 K.B. 130.
36. (1877), 2 App. Cas. 439.
37. (1888), 40 Ch. D. 268.
38. On this development, see M.P. Thompson, "From Representation to Expectation: Estoppel
as a Cause of Action", [1983] C.LJ.257; and H. K. Lucke, "Non-Contractual Arrangements
For the Modification of Performance: Forbearance, Waiver and Equitable Estoppel" (1991),

21 Western Aust. L.R. 149.
InHughes v MetropolitanRailway, supra,note 36, Lord Cairns LC set out the since oft-quoted

view that:
"... the first principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed, [is] that if parties who
have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal results - certain
penalties or legal forfeiture -afterwards by their own act or with their own consent enter
upon a course of negotiation which has the effect of leading one of the parties to suppose
that the strict rights arising under the contract will not be enforced, or will be kept in

suspense, or held in abeyance, the person who otherwise might have enforced those
rights will not be allowed to enforce them where it would be inequitable having regard

to the dealings which have then taken place between the parties." (p. 448)
In BirminghamandDistrictLandCompany v London andNorth Western RailwayCo., supra,
note 37, the Court of Appeal expanded this principle beyond cases of forfeiture and applied it
to all situations where there is a modification of contractual rights.
39. CentralLondon Property Trust Ltd. v High Trees House Ltd., supra,note 35, p. 134.
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The matter seemed to be clarified in Combe v. Combe,4 ° where a wife
brought an action on a promise made by the husband before their divorce
to allow the wife £100 free of tax. Denning L.J. rejected the view that
High Trees could be applied to support the wife's claim. He said "That
principle [in High Trees] does not create causes of action where none
existed before. It only prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal
rights when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them, having
regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties."'
Denning L.J. conceded that the estoppel could be a part of a cause of
action, but not be the cause of action itself. The concern was clearly that
the doctrine of consideration not be undermined. "Seeing that the principle
never stands alone as giving a cause of action in itself, it can never do
away with the necessity of consideration when that is an essential part of
the cause of action. The doctrine of consideration is too firmly fixed to be
overthrown by a side-wind. Its ill-effects have been largely mitigated of
late, but it still remains a cardinal necessity of the formation of a contract,
though not of its modification or discharge."42 Denning J. did not specify
how large a "part" of a cause of action estoppel could be. There seems to
be nothing to prevent its being a large part. Why, it must be asked, can
estoppel form the bulk of a cause of action, but there still be a requirement
of contract for the sake of form? 13
Lord Denning MR emphasised the importance of equitable notions in
estoppel in his judgment in Crabbv. Arun DistrictCouncil.44 In that case,
the plaintiff sold off the part of its land having access to a road only after
assurances from the defendant council that the plaintiff would be entitled
to continue to gain access to the road by using the council's property,
which bordered the land the plaintiff was to retain. The Court of Appeal
held that the council was estopped from denying the plaintiff continued
access across its property. Lord Denning MR said that estoppel was just
a method of preventing someone from insisting on otherwise strict legal
rights. An estoppel could arise because of an agreement, words or
conduct. Lord Denning made it clear that the prevention of insistence on
strict legal rights could occur because of a contract or, in the absence of
contract, by estoppel. Thus contract and estoppel were set together as
alternative means to reach the same result.

40. [1951] 2 K.B. 215 (C.A.).

41. Ibid., p. 219 .
42. Ibid., p. 220.
43. The effect of the decision in Combe v Combe was to take the law on promissory estoppel
back to the clear statement of Bowen LI in Low v Bouverie, [I 89113 Ch. D. 82, that: "Estoppel
is only a rule of evidence; you cannot found an action upon estoppel." (p. 105).
44. [19761 1 Ch. 179 (C.A.).
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Scarman L.J. in Crabbwent even further and said that "... I do not find
helpful the distinction between promissory and proprietary estoppel. This
distinction may indeed be valuable to those who have to teach or expound
the law; but I do not think that, in solving the particular problem raised
by a particular case, putting the law into categories is of the slightest
assistance."4 5 Since proprietary estoppel can give rise to a cause of action,
it would seem that Scarman L.J. would accept promissory estoppel also
giving rise to a cause of action in some cases. Scarmnan L.J. accepted
Ramsden v. Dyson as the starting point of modem equitable estoppel and
agreed with Lord Denning MR that the dissenting speech there of Lord
Kingsdown is to be preferred where it was said that a valid agreement was
46
not necessary - an expectation created or encouraged would suffice.
Scarman L.J. also emphasised the importance of unconscionability - an
47
important feature in recent Australia cases.
English courts have come some long way to Lord St. Leonards'
position inJordenv. Money that intention for the future can be guaranteed
other than by means of a contract.48 Obligations will not be left solely for
parties to frame, as sturdy independent actors, by making a contract. The
court will sometimes take a more interventionist role and recognise other
means of ensuring that an expression of future intention can be guaranteed.
What is new and different from Lord St. Leonards' concerns is the
solicitude expressed to protect the law of contract - and the doctrine of
consideration in particular. Strangely, it is not contemplated that perhaps
contract and consideration could be altered to encompass the new
49
concerns. They are spoken of only in terms of being "undermined".
45. Combe v Combe, supra, note 40, p. 193.
46. Ibid., p. 194.
47. The impact of Crabb v Arun was recognized by Oliver J. in Taylor's Fashions Ltd. v
Liverpool Trustees Co., [1982] 1 Q.B. 133, a case that was heard in the Chancery Division in

1979. OliverJ. noted that one ofthe "particularly interesting features" ofCrabbwas "the virtual
equation of promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel or estoppel by acquiescence as mere
facets of the same principle." Oliver J. also noted the importance of unconscionability in
deciding whether one party should be estopped.
48. See, e.g., the Privy Council inAjayi v R. T. Briscoe (Nigeria)Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1326.

49. Lord Denning MR recognised that there need not be a contract in order to establish a
promissory estoppel in Evenden v Guildford City AFC Ltd., [ 1975] 1 Q.B. 917, 924 (C.A.).
However, Lord Denning MR did not expressly say that the estoppel could be the cause of
action. The English courts discussed the larger picture of the different categories of estoppel
and recent Australian developments in MoorgateMercantile Co. Ltd. v Twitchings, [ 1976] 1

Q.B. 225 (C.A.). Lord Denning gave his opinion on estoppel generally - not, it would appear,
confined to estoppel by conduct which was argued in the case. He said that: "Estoppel is not

a rule of evidence. It is not a cause of action. It is a principle ofjustice and equity. It comes to
this: when a man, by his word or conduct, has led another to believe in a particular state of
affairs, he will not be allowed to go back on it when it would be unjust and inequitable for him
to do so."(at p. 244) The judgment is also very significant as an attempt 1) to incorporate the
Australian jurisprudence on estoppel and 2) as an attempt to make generalised statements about
estoppel and not distinguish one type of estoppel from another.
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Although the most significant recent developments in promissory
estoppel come from Australia, the impetus for change began in England
in AmalgamatedInvestment & ProprietaryCo. Ltd. v. Texas Commerce
InternationalBank Ltd 50 Of particular interest is the decision by Robert
Goff J. at the Queen's Bench level. The case concerned the issue of
whether a parent company could be estopped from denying that it would
not cover liability of its subsidiary company in respect of a loan made to
the subsidiary by abank. Both the Queen's Bench and the Court of Appeal
held that the parent company was estopped from denying its liability.
Robert Goff J. thought that "Of all doctrines, equitable estoppel is surely
one of the most flexible."'" He said that he saw no reason, in logic or in
authority, why the cause of action assisted by the estoppel should not
consist of a contractual right. 2 He went on to say that there were three
categories of cases where it was not true that a cause of action in contract
could not be created by estoppel:
a) where fraud would be created otherwise, as where one party has
encouraged another to expend money on land in the expectation of
receiving an interest in the land,
b) promissory estoppel- where one says one will not enforce contractual
rights,
c) where one party represents to another that a transaction has an effect
which in law it does not have.
So, Robert Goff J. was clear that estoppel could affect the requirement of
consideration, but not necessarily the need for contract. What he seemed
to be imagining was a contract or enforceable contractual obligations
without the requirement of consideration, at least consideration as it is
usually envisaged.
The judges in the Court of Appeal did not add a great deal to the topic
in their judgments. Lord Denning M.R. did not think it was necessary to
go through all the cases on estoppel. He simply thought all the statements
on estoppel "can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn
of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of
an underlying assumption - either of fact or of law - whether due to
misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference - on which they have
conducted the dealings between them - neither of them will be allowed
to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow

50. [1982] 1 Q.B. 84 (Q.B. and C.A.).
51. Ibid., p. 103.
52. He cited Spiro v Lintern, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1002 as authority.
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him to do so." 53 Brandon L.J. said that the true proposition of law was that
"...while a party cannot in terms found a cause of action on estoppel, he
may, as result of being able to rely on estoppel succeed on a cause of
action on which, without being able to rely on that estoppel, he would
'
necessarily have failed."54
2. AustralianDevelopments
There is a recent trio of cases from the High Court of Australia55 that
forces a rethinking of promissory estoppel. Certainly the cases have
transformed thinking about the law of obligations in Australia.56 These
Australian cases are disparate in terms of what the judges say and the
language they use. The judges recognize that they are making profound
changes in the law, but they tend to inject cautionary notes to the effect
that their pronouncements are in accord with existing learning.
There is some continuity in the judges involved in the Australian cases.
This section examines the views of the three judges who wrote in all three
cases and made significant contributions to the discussion on estoppel.
Rather than dealing with each case in turn, it is more valuable to treat each
judge in turn, looking at how his views developed over the three
judgments. First the facts of the three cases will be set out.57
The first case was Waltons Stores v. Maher.5 The facts in that case
were fairly straightforward. Waltons Stores' solicitors led the Mahers to
believe that a deal would be concluded whereby Waltons Stores would
lease the Mahers' property if only the Mahers would build a new building
on it. The Mahers' solicitor forwarded to Waltons Stores' solicitor an
executed lease "by way of exchange". Nothing further was heard from the
Waltons side for two months. In the meantime, the Mahers began their
53.AmalgamatedInvestment & PropertyCo.Ltd. v Texas Commerce InternationalBankLtd.,supra,note 50, p. 122.
54. Ibid., pp. 131-132.
55. Waltons Stores (Interstate)Ltd. v Maher, (1988), 164 C.L.R. 387; Foran v Wight (1989),
88 A.L.R. 413; Commonwealth of Australiav Verwayen (1990), 95 A.L.R. 321.
56. See, e.g., Silovi Pty Ltd. v Barbaro(1988), 13 N.S.W.L.R. 466 (C.A.); Austotel Pty Ltd.
v FranklinsSelfserve Pty Ltd. (1989), 16 N.S.W.L.R. 582 (C.A.); Hawker PacificPty Ltd. v
HelicopterCharterPty Ltd. (1991), 22 N.S.W.L.R. 298 (C.A.).
57. Many of the other judges who sat to hear the cases said nothing about the doctrine of

estoppel, or at least said very little. It is not necessary for the purposes of this paper to deal with
those judges, except to note that there were other ways that the court might have reached the

same results without employing the doctrine ofestoppel, at least in the opinion of some of the
judges. (E.g. in Verwayen, Toohey Jused waiver and Gaudron Jused a doctrine of detrimental
change of position. In Foranv Wight, Gaudron J used waiver.) See, also, M. Dorney, "The New
Estoppel", supra, note 25; A. Leopold, "Estoppel: A Practical Appraisal of Recent
Developments", supra,note 23; M. Spence, "Estoppel and Limitation" (1991), 107 LQR 221.
58. Supra, note 55.
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part of the bargain they thought had been struck by tearing down the
building on the site and beginning the new construction. Waltons Stores
began to have second thoughts about the new location and so told the
solicitors to "go slow". Two months after the Malters had sent their
executed lease, the building was forty per cent complete. Then the Mahers
were informed that Waltons Stores did not want to complete. It was found
as a fact that Waltons knew of the demolition and beginning of construction.
The different judges in the High Court all reached the conclusion that
there was no contract concluded, but held that on the basis of estoppel the
Mahers could get the benefit they would have received if there had been
a contract.
The next case was Foranv. Wight 9 This case again dealt with land.
The question here was whether one party could recover its deposit when
that party committed anticipatory breach of its contract to sell land. There
was some doubt as to whether the innocent party would have itself been
ready and able to complete. In that context the question arose of whether
the vendor was estopped from denying that it would not require the
purchaser to show that it would have been ready and able to complete on
the date set for closing, in light of the statement by the vendor that the
vendor would not be able to close. The court held by a majority that the
purchasers were entitled to rescind and to recover their deposit.
The most recent case is Commonwealth of Australia v. Verwayen.60
This was a case about an Australian sailor who wanted to sue the
government as a result of injuries caused by a collision between two
Royal Australian Navy vessels. The collision occurred in 1964 but no
Statement of Claim was issued until 1984. The Commonwealth had
stated that it did not contest liability and that its policy was not to raise the
LimitationAct in such cases. Then the Commonwealth changed its mind
and argued that the claim of the sailor was barred by the expiration of the
limitation period. The sailor argued that the Commonwealth was estopped
from denying that it was obliged to compensate the sailor. The majority
of the High Court agreed with the sailor.6 1

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. There are Canadian cases which resist the notion that estoppel could affect a limitation
period: e.g. Viau vSavard(1984), 31 Alta. LR (2d) 150 (Q.B.); Cohen v Minister ofNational
Revenue (1991); 40 F.T.R. 225 (T.D.); Re Apple Meadows Ltd and Government of Manitoba
(1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 58 (Man. CA). These cases appear to fit into the notion that estoppel
should not affect a rule set down by statute. This reluctance seems to have been disapproved
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Maraclev TravellersIndemnity Co. (1991), 125 N.R. 294
(S.C.C.); and Marichischukv Dominion IndustrialSupplies (1991), 125 N.R. 306 (S.C.C.).
However, The Supreme Court of Canada set out a very orthodox interpretation of promissory
estoppel in those cases.
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It is worth noting that none of the three cases was what might be called
a typical contract case. The Verwayen case had most to do with procedure.
The Forancase was mainly about the recovery of deposits. The Waltons
Stores case was about obligations in a situation where the writing
requirements had not been met. Nonetheless the judges in all three cases,
to the extent they addressed the issues of estoppel and contract, did not
limit their comments on the basis that the cases in front of them were not
usual, though they did limit them for other reasons.
(i) Mason C. J.
Mason C.J. wrote a joint judgment with Wilson J. in Waltons Stores.
Mason C.J. could find no basis in Waltons for a common law estoppel by
representation because of his view that the respondents assured the
appellants that an exchange of contract would take place, not that it had
taken place. Mason C.J. thought it unwise to change the law that common
law estoppel does not act with reference to future actions and facts. Even
a change affecting only estoppel by representation was deemed unwise
because "...the result would be to fragment the unity of the common law
conception of estoppel and to confine the troublesome distinction at the
price of introducing another which is equally artificial."'6
So, Mason C.J. turned to promissory estoppel. He said that the doctrine
had been mainly confined to precluding departure from a representation
by a person in a pre-existing contractual relationship that he would not
enforce his contractual rights, whether they were pre-existing or rights to
be acquired as a result of the representation.6 3 The only way that
promissory estoppel could be used by the Mahers was if the court went
one step further and enforced directly, in the absence of a pre-existing
relationship of any kind, a non-contractual promise on which the Mahers
had relied to their detriment Thereby a new legal relationship would be
created by promissory estoppel. 64
Unconscionability was the key sought by Mason C.J. to determine
when it might be appropriate to hold that an obligation would be enforced

62. Waltons Stores v Maher, supra, note 55, p. 399.

63. Ibid.
64. Mason C.J. noted that the United States had reached this position in section 90 of the
Restatement on Contracts 2d. He said however that the developments in the U.S. should be

viewed "with some caution". "There promissory estoppel developed partly in response to the
limiting effects of the adoption of the bargain theory of consideration which has not been
expressly adopted in Australia or England."(p. 402) Mason C.J. did not make much of an
argument to support his conclusion and did not really say why the different historical origins

were relevant anyway.
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in the absence of a contract or other pre-existing legal relationship. Mason
C.J. reviewed the cases and said:
"One may therefore discern in the cases a common thread which links them
together, namely, the principle that equity will come to the relief-of a
plaintiff who has acted to his detriment on the basis of a basic assumption
in relation to which the other party to transaction has 'played such a part
in the adoption of the assumption that it would be unfair or unjust if he were
left free to ignore it'..." '65
It was the Chief Justice's view that holding the representor to his66
representation was merely one way of doing justice between the parties.
A mere failure to fulfill a promise was not in itself unconscionable something more would be required. "Humphrey's Estate67suggests that
this may be found, if at all, in the creation or encouragement by the party
estopped in the other party of an assumption that a contract will come into
existence or a promise will be performed and that the other party relied
on that assumption to his detriment to the knowledge of the first party. 65
Mason C.J. put forward a relatively clear view of what he was doing
in Waltons Stores. He purported to base his decision on authority. Though
there was some case support for what he was doing, it would have been
more forthright to state that he was deviating from orthodoxy as to
promissory estoppel. Mason C.J. kept the old requirements as to estoppel
but rejected the requirement that there had to be apre-existing relationship
for promissory estoppel to work. The Chief Justice's assessment of
unconscionability was simply a reworking of the notion that there be
reliance and detriment suffered in order to establish an estoppel. There is
some circularity involved here: there will be estoppel when there is
unconscionability and unconscionability will be found when the
requirements of estoppel are met.
In Foranv. Wight, Mason C.J. dissented in the result. It is significant
that in Foran v. Wight Mason C.J. spoke of the doctrine of estoppel.
Nowhere in Waltons was such a general term used - rather there was
reference to "common law estoppel" and "the doctrine of promissory
estoppel". The views of Deane J. in Waltons, which will be examined
shortly, seem to have had an impact on Mason C.J. Mason C.J. said that
he had decided Waltons by reference to promissory estoppel which, he
said,"extends to representations orpromises as to future conduct" 69.Mason

65. Ibid., at p. 404, quoting Dixon J in Grundtv GreatBoulderProprietaryGold Mines Ltd.

(1937), 59 C.L.R. 641 at p. 675.
66. Waltons Stores v Maher, supra, note 55, p. 405.
67. Attorney General(Hong Kong) v Humphreys EstateLtd., [ 1987] 1 A.C. 114.
68. Waltons Stores v Maher, supra, note 55, p. 406.
69. Foran v Wight, supra, note 55, p. 430.
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C.J. implied that he did not address common law estoppel in Waltons
because it had not been argued that Jordenv. Money should be reversed.
But in Foran v. Wight Mason C.J. said:
"On further reflection it seems to me that we should now recognise that a
common law estoppel as well as an equitable estoppel may arise out of a
representation or mistaken assumption as to future conduct. To do so
would give greater unity and consistency to the general doctrine of
estoppel. Moreover, the clear acceptance by the court in Waltons Stores of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel makes this course inevitable. After all,
it was the apprehension that representations as to future conduct,
unsupported by consideration, would invade the territory of promises for
valuable consideration that led to the confinement of common law estoppel
to representations of existing fact. Given the recognition of promissory
estoppel and the fact that the doctrine may include the enforcement of
rights atleastbetween parties in apre-existing contractual relationship, the
dam wall has fractured at its most critical point with the result we should
accept that a representation or a mistaken assumption as to future conduct
will in appropriate circumstances create a common law estoppel as well as
an equitable estoppel." 1o
Mason C.J. said little more than this about estoppel in Foran.Mason
C.J. did not elaborate on how the new common law estoppel differs from
equitable estoppel, although he did not seem to envisage a complete
merger or fusion of the two. In Foranitself it is not clear which estoppel
Mason C.J. applied, although it was probably common law estoppel
(which he found to be unavailable to the purchaser because of lack of
detrimental consequences or reliance upon the representation ). Mason
C.J. alluded to the issue of an invasion of the territory of consideration,
but simply concluded that it was no longer a problem. There was no
discussion of how the law of contract would be affected by this expansion
ofestoppel. Nor was there any reference to a distinction between common
law estoppel and equitable estoppel on the basis that one relates to
evidence and the other to substance.
Mason C.J. also addressed the issue in Verwayen. 1 Mason C.J. went
even further in this case in expressly adopting a single vision of estoppel.
Promissory estoppel according to Mason C.J., "has undermined the idea
that voluntary promises cannot be enforced in absence of consideration." 72
In Mason C.J.'s view, "...the consistent trend in the modem decisions

70. Ibid., pp. 430-431.
71. In Verwayen itself, Mason C.J. dissented in the result on the basis that to hold the
Commonwealth to its representations, thereby depriving it of defences available by statute or
general law, would be a disproportionate response to the detriment of the respondent suffered
in reliance on the assumption that the defences would not be pleaded.
72. Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen, supra, note 55, p. 331.
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points inexorably towards the emergence of one overarching doctrine of
estoppel rather than a series of independent rules..."73 It was "anomdous
and potentially unjust" for the two doctrines of estoppel, one common law
and one equitable, "to inhabit the same territory and yet produce different
results" 74 So, according to Mason C.J.: "There is no longer any purpose
to be served in recognising in them an evidentiary form of estoppel
operating in the same circumstances as the emergent rules of substantive
estoppel. ' '75 There should be only one form of estoppel whose purpose is
to prevent a person from suffering detriment because of induced reliance.
A central element of the new unified doctrine was proportionality
between the remedy and the detriment which was to be avoided.
Mason C.J. seemed to envisage the elimination of common law
estoppel and a replacement of it by equitable estoppel, wherein a court
should tailor the remedy to what is equitable and just. Does this mean that
estoppel no longer has an evidentiary role? Mason C.J. does not say so and
seems to indicate rather that the evidentiary role will no longer exist
where there is an overlap with substance. It is not clear how it can be said
that these two overlap so that at some point estoppel can no longer be said
to have an evidentiary role. The ramifications are not specified or
examined. The new unified estoppel of Mason C.J. seems to operate as
to "assumptions". Mason C.J. did not elaborate on what constitutes an
assumption. Is an expectation an assumption? To what extent does an
assumption have to be the creation of both parties to the contract?
(ii) Deane J.
With the succeeding cases, it is clear that Deane J.'s views, the most
radical in Waltons Stores,76 have had a strong impact. In Waltons, Deane
J. thought that the facts sufficed to found an estoppel by conduct on the
basis that the Mahers had been led to rely on a belief that the store contract
had been completed. Deane J. found no basis in principle for a construction
of the doctrine of estoppel "in a way which would preclude a plaintiff
from relying upon the assumed or represented mistaken state of affairs ...
as the factual foundation of a cause of action arising under ordinary

73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., p. 332.
75. Ibid., p. 333.
76. Indeed in Silovi ProprietaryLtd. v Barbaro,supra,note 56, Priestley J.A. did not even put
Deane J.'s views on his chart ofhow the reasons in Waltons can be standardized and reconciled.
(See p. 476). Deane J's tentative thoughts on the possible applications of promissory estoppel
can be found in Reed v Sheehan (1982), 56 FLR 206 (Fed. Ct. of Aust., Gen. Div.).
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principles of the law. ' 7 Thus estoppel could provide the factual foundation
for an ordinary action for enforcement of the "contract" between Mahers
and Waltons Stores, notwithstanding the fact that no "binding contract"
had actually been made. Estoppel, according to Deane J., outflanked any
writing requirements for such a contract by preventing denial of the
existence of a binding agreement.
Despite this finding, Deane J. went on to consider the situation if it
were established that Maher thought contracts were to be exchanged
rather than that they had actually been exchanged. So he considered
promissory estoppel. Deane J. saw promissory estoppel as simply the
equitable manifestation of estoppel by conduct. Deane J.'s theory was
that given the fusion of law and equity, there was no longer any reason to
preserve past distinctions based on the separation of the two systems of
law.7" Even before the fusion of law and equity, according to Deane J.,
there was a general consistency, both in content and rationale, between
common law and equity principles relating to estoppel by conduct, a
proposition for which Deane J. provided a couple of authorities.7 9
The only reason that representations or assumptions about future
conduct could be excluded from either common law or equitable estoppel
was concern for the primacy of the doctrine of consideration. However,
the distinction between a representation or assumption of existing fact
and one of future action or inaction had, according to Deane J., always sat
uncomfortably with the general notions of good conscience and fair
dealing which underlay the common law as well as equitable doctrines of
estoppel by conduct.8" Estoppel by conduct was meant to preclude
unconscionability and according to Deane J. was a doctrine of substantive
law. The limiting or controlling factor was unconscionability.
Deane J. adopted rather singular terminology, lumping together, as he
did, promissory estoppel and estoppel by conduct. He also glossed over
what exactly was the problem posed by consideration. Deane J. concluded
that a (common law) estoppel by conduct could found a cause of action.
His reasoning in Waltons would seem to indicate that the same rationale
ought to apply to equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel. If so, then
the doctrine of consideration is surely affected. Furthermore, the distinction
between the evidentiary function for estoppel and its substantive role is

77. Waltons Stores v Maher,supra, note 55, p. 445.
78. See P. Perell, The Fusion of Law andEquity, supra,note 25, ch. 11. Perell concludes that
it is too early to say whether a comprehensive and fused principle covering law and equity will
be established (p. 111).
79. Waltons Stores v Maher,supra, note 55, pp. 447-448.

80. Ibid., p. 449.
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too basic and well entrenched to be lightly brushed aside as it was by
Deane J. The other problem is that Deane J. gave no guidance as to what
is incorporated by the notion of unconscionability. Deane J.'s treatment,
therefore, although perhaps welcome in its attempt at simplification of
the learning on estoppel, ignored or trivialisedmany important distinctions
and failed to explain why they are no longer relevant.
In Foranv. Wight, Deane J. went on to say that he was willing to take
the step which he refrained from taking in Waltons Stores, namely that
"the doctrine of estoppel by conduct extends, as a matter of general
principle, to a representation or induced 'assumption of fact or law,
present or future'." 8 So the representation can be to future fact - and as
to the state of the law. Part of Deane J.'s reason for extending it to
questions of law seems to do with his view that statements of law must
have some factual basis. Deane J. noted that it might be difficult to
establish estoppel if what was held was simply an opinion.
In Commonwealth of Australia v. Verwayen, Deane J. attempted to
clarify his position on estoppel. He said that he agreed with the point that
"promissory estoppel does not of itself give rise to any entitlement to
relief in equity".,2 Deane J. continued:
"A fortiori, estoppel does not of itself provide an independent cause of
action in equity for non-traditional equitable relief in the form of
compensatory damages under Lord Cairns' Act or subsequent statutory
provisions, for the detriment caused by departure from an otherwise
unenforceable promise as to future conduct. If it did,-promissory estoppel
could no longer be said to provide a basis upon which ordinary principles
of law, including the doctrine of consideration, would operate ... . To the

contrary, it would directly confound the doctrine of consideration and, in
a case of promissory estoppel where consideration had moved from the
promisee but compensatory damages for detriment sustained exceeded
damages for loss of bargain, simply override the law of contract." 3
To make his point, Deane J. gave an example wherein he said that a
landowner would be precluded by estoppel from denying a transfer in title
to the party to whom a representation had been made that the transfer
would take place or had taken place. The representee could claim relief
by seeking a declaration of trust or an order for transfer. Estoppel, Deane
J. said, did not give rise to a cause of action. But does this follow? If there
were a contract between parties relating to land, an order for transfer
could also be sought and it could hardly be denied that the cause of action

81. Foranv Wight, supra, note 55, p. 448.
82. Commonwealth of Australiav Verwayen, supra, note 55, p. 350.
83. Ibid., pp. 352-353.
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did not arise from the contract. Itis not satisfactorily explained why, when
estoppel provides the basis for the claim to an order for transfer, it cannot
be said that estoppel gives rise to a cause of action.
Deane J. went on to support his point further by saying that if the
representor ("A") had no interest in the land purportedly the subject of the
transfer, then the representee ("B") could gain no assistance from
estoppel to make a claim against A. "The reason why that is so is that the
estoppel of itself gives rise to no cause of action and the assumed facts
which it would establish would not provide an ingredient of a cause of
action against A."8' 4 There is no good reason given why it cannot be said
that B should not have a cause of action against A if A's representation
has caused B to rely on it to B's detriment. The case is similar to a case
like McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission 5 where
compensation was awarded for expenses incurred in anticipation of the
salvage of a tanker that in fact did not exist. The similarity is such that
there is no justification for the differing results in the two cases.
One should note that in WaltonsStoresv. Maherthere was no contract,
but yet a cause of action arose. This was because the estoppel gave rise
to the assumption that a contract would be entered into. But surely it is
disingenuous to suggest that it was the contract that gave rise to the cause
of action and not the estoppel. The view of Deane J. is formalistic. It
makes the contract absolutely meaningless -just a formal step which
must be gone through to get from estoppel to remedy. Deane J.,
commendable though his views might be in simplifying estoppel, refused
to dispose of the most formalistic aspect of this part of law, namely the
denial that the estoppel can create a cause of action. Deane J. noted that
the scope for relief in the event of estoppel by conduct was broad. He even
admitted that in some cases, "...the appropriate order may be an order for
compensatory damages". 86 - surely a step close to admitting estoppel's
kinship with contract and tort.
(iii) BrennanJ.
In Waltons Stores, Brennan J. clearly distinguished between an estoppel
in pais and equitable estoppel. An estoppel in pais related to a situation
where one party has led another to make an assumption about the
existence of a state of affairs. "The effect of an estoppel in pais is not to

84. Ibid., p. 351.
85. (1951), 84 C.L.R. 377.
35 5
.
86. Commonwealth ofAustralia v Verwayen, supra,note 55, p.
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create a right in one party against the other; it is to establish the state of
affairs by reference to which the legal relationship between them is
ascertained."87 So phrased, according to Brennan J., the scope of estoppel
in pais did not extend to compel adherence to representations ofintention. 88
Brennan J. acknowledged that estoppel in pais was mostly a rule of
evidence - but as a result of facts established by the evidence a cause of
action would be enforced, for example, where the estoppel related to the
existence of a contract between the parties, the contract would create a
cause of action.
Contrasted with estoppel in pals was equitable estoppel which did not
operate by establishing an assumed state of affairs - but was a "source of
legal obligation"., 9 "It is not enforceable against the party estopped
because a cause of action or ground of defence would arise on an assumed
state of affairs; it is the source of a legal obligation arising on an actual
state of affairs. An equitable estoppel is binding in conscience on the party
estopped, and it is to be satisfied by that party doing or abstaining from
doing something in order to prevent detriment to the party raising the
estoppel which that party would otherwise suffer by having acted or
abstained from acting in reliance on the assumption or expectation which
he has been induced to adopt." 90 The principle on which equitable
estoppel rested was unconscionability. In giving a remedy where a legal
obligation was created by equitable estoppel the court "as a court of
conscience, goes no further than is necessary to prevent unconscionable
conduct." 91
According to Brennan J., "... a promissory or proprietary estoppel may
arise when a party, not mistaking any facts, erroneously attributes a
binding legal effect to a promise made without consideration." 92 The
estoppel would have no effect if an assumption or expectation was not
intended by the promisor or understood by the promisee to affect their
legal relations. Having set out the basis for how equitable estoppel could
work, Brennan J. sought to elaborate on the key element of
unconscionability. Like all judges, he had a difficult time giving a
satisfactory and comprehensive definition to this concept. He said:
"The unconscionable conduct which it is the object of equity to prevent is
a failure of a party, who has induced the adoption of the assumption or
expectation and who knew or intended that it would be relied on, to fulfill
87. Waltons Stores v Maher, supra, note 55, p. 414.
88. Ibid., p. 415.
89. Ibid., p. 416.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., p. 419.
92. Ibid., p. 4 2 1.
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the assumption or expectation or otherwise to avoid the detriment which
that failure would occasion. The object of the equity is not to compel the
party bound to fulfil the assumption or expectation; it is to avoid the
detriment which, if the assumption or expectation goes unfulfilled, will be
suffered by
the party who has been induced to act or abstain from acting
93
thereon.

In this way, according to Brennan J., the doctrine of consideration was not
affected, but Brennan J. recognised that there will be times when the
difference between the two, estoppel and consideration, would be slight
(at least in result).
But, despite this similarity, Brennan J. explained that a contractual
obligation was created by agreement of the parties, whereas an equity
imposed by estoppel might be imposed irrespective of any agreement by
the party bound. The measure of a contractual obligation depended on the
contract; the measure of an equity created by estoppel varied according
to what was necessary to prevent detriment resulting from unconscionable
conduct. According to Brennan J., that was such a sufficient difference
that consideration would not be undermined. There was therefore no need
for a limitation confining promissory estoppel to prevention of the
enforcement of existing legal rights. The sword versus shield distinction
was therefore unwarranted. Moreover, Brennan J. noted that there was no
such limit on proprietary estoppel and it was just another form of
equitable estoppel.
Brennan kept the orthodox views of the distinction between different
types of estoppel but expanded promissory estoppel. He recognised that
it created a cause of action. But his distinction between contract and
estoppel was weak for the reason he well recognised. They give the same
result and lead to the same existence of a cause of action. One is left with
the definite impression thatrespect for the existing doctrine of consideration.
was a token rather than a real effort.
Brennan J. did not much elaborate on his views on estoppel in the other
two cases. In Verwayen, he made it clear that his views had not changed.
He stressed the role of unconscionability and said that "the remedy [of
equitable estoppel] is not designed to enforce the promise although, in
some situations (of which Waltons Storesv. Maher affords an example),
the minimum equity will not be satisfied by anything short of enforcing
the promise." 94

93. Ibid., p. 423.
94. Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen, supra, note 55, p. 345.
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3. CanadianDevelopments
Canadian cases have, with a few exceptions, followed English
developments. There is not a strong Canadian jurisprudence on estoppel.
Courts are most comfortable using short summaries of learning from
English cases, or to take a particularly pertinent extract from Spencer
Bower and Turner on the Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation.95
In Canadian Superior Oil v. Paddon-HughesDev. Co.,96 the issue
arose of whether one party was estopped from denying that a petroleum
and natural gas lease had come to an end. Martland J, for the Court, said
clearly that "a cause of action cannot be founded upon estoppel 97 . He
said that the principle in Hughes v. MetropolitanRailway:
"... assumes the existence of a legal relationship between the parties when
the representation is made. It applies where a party to a contract represents
to the other party that the former will not enforce his strict legal rights under
it. In the present case, however, the contractual relationship between the
parties had come to an end before any representation is alleged to have
been made."98
Therefore, there could be no estoppel.
Canadian cases have taken a similar approach without analysing why
it is that estoppel should not form a cause of action or what the
justification for estoppel is. In GilbertSteel Ltd. v. UniversityConstruction
Ltd.,9 9 Wilson J.A. agreed with the maxim that "estoppel can never be
used as a sword but only as a shield". 00 The Ontario Court of Appeal, like
countless other Canadian courts,'0 required that an existing legal

95. See, e.g., CAEAircraftLtd. v CanadianCommercialCorp.(1989), 57 Man. R. (2d) 1 (QB)
at pp. 11-12.
96. [19701 S.C.R. 932.
97. Ibid., at p. 937.
98. Ibid., at p. 938.
99. Supra, note 8. See criticism of this case, and the doctrine of consideration, in John Swan,
"Consideration and the Reasons for Enforcing Contracts" (1976), 15 UWO Law Rev. 83; and
in Reiter, "Courts, Consideration and Common Sense" (1977), 27 U.T. L.J. 439 at 483ff.
100. GilbertSteel Ltd. v University ConstructionLtd., supra, note 8, at p. 610.
101. See also CAEAircraft, supra, note 95; FobascoLtd. v Cogan(1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 254
(H.C.J.); and see Stevenson JA in Smoky River Coal Ltd. v UnitedSteelworkers of America,
Local 7621 (1985), 38 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193 (C.A.), where he said that the sword/shield
distinction was not "helpful", but said that when the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
applicable, "It only prevents a party from insisting on his strict legal rights...." p. 197, citing
Combe v Combe, supra, note 40. See also Owen Sound Public Library Board v Mial
Developments Ltd. (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 685 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused
(1980), 31 N.R. 449n; and Petridisv Shabinsky (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 215 (H.C.J.). See a very
recent non-discussion of promissory estoppel in Maraclev TravellersIndemnity Co, supra,
note 61.
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relationship, normally a contract, be altered, in order for promissory
estoppel to be available."
Although there is not the strength of authority for change in estoppel
in Canada that there is in Australia and England, there have been some
notable judges and courts willing to challenge the orthodox notions on
promissory estoppel and the creation of obligations. 103 In Re Tudale
ExplorationsLtd. andBruce,04GrangeJ, writing for the Court, noted that
"the sword/shield maxim has been heavily criticized" and added that "I
must confess to difficulty in seeing the logic of the distinction and it does
However, the matter did not call
not appear to be universally applied". 101
for elaboration in that case. Osborne J. followed this critical vein in
Edwards v. Harris-Intertype(Canada)Ltd.10 6 where he wrote:
"It is apparent that the weight of authority prior to the Tudale decision was
that promissory estoppel could be used solely as a defence, and could not
be asserted as a cause of action. None of the decisions since GilbertSteel
unequivocally state [sic] that estoppel may constitute a cause of action, but
many move in that direction."' 17
The Court of Appeal0 5 simply said that it was " not necessary to decide
whether promissory estoppel can provide the basis of a cause of action
where none existed, because the trial judge found as a fact that the
appellant did not alter its position to its detriment... ,"109
Rice J.A. picked up on this theme in Robichaudv. Caissepopulairede
Pokemouche Ltee. 110 In that case, the Caisse populaire had a judgment
obtained against Robichaud. Avco Financial Services, on behalf of
Robichaud, entered into an arrangement with the manager of the Caisse
populaire to pay off a little over one quarter of the amount owed by
Robichaud to the Caisse populaire in full satisfaction of the debt. Avco
paid the agreed amount to the Caisse populaire but the Board of Directors
of the Caisse populaire refused to ratify the agreement between Avco and

102. See Cominco Ltd. v Canadian Pacific Ltd., (1988), 24 B.C.L.R. (2d) 124 (S.C.);
Campbell v Inverness County (1990), 98 N.S.R. (2d) 330 (S.C.T.D.); Re CanadianSuperior

OilLtd.andJacobson(1990), 81 D.L.R.(4th) 526 (Alta. C.A.); Town of FortFrancisv Boise
Cascade CanadaLtd. (1983), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court of Canada in that latter case did not explore the meaning of "inequity" which it said was
the basis for promissory estoppel.
103. See, generally, J.A.Manwaring, "Promissory Estoppel in the Supreme Court of Canada"

(1987), 10 Dal. L J43.
104. (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 593 (Div. Ct.).
105. Ibid., p. 597.
106. (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 558 (H.C.J.).
107. Ibid., p. 570.
108. (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 319.
109. Ibid., p. 320.
110. (1990), 264 A.P.R. 227 (N.B.C.A.).
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the Caisse populaire manager. Robichaud argued that the Caissepopulaire
was estopped from claiming the (higher) judgment amount. Ayles and
Angers JJ.A. found for Robichaud on the basis of accord and satisfaction.
Rice J.A. decided on the basis of estoppel. He noted that Robichaud was
trying to use promissory estoppel as a sword and that the bulk of authority
was contrary to that use. He also noted the criticism that had been made
of the sword/shield distinction. He alluded to the fortuitousness of the
distinction, depending as it does on who is plaintiff and who defendant.
He wrote:
"In this matter, the Caisse can plead rights available to it prior to its promise
by relying on the judgment against the appellant without bringing any
proceedings against him and without the appellant being able to plead his
rights resulting from this agreement. If the doctrine of promissory estoppel
can be successfully invoked in defense in an action by the Caisse against
the appellant, given the circumstances between them, then to reject his
application under the pretext that it was not invoked as a defense is, in my
opinion, untenable and contrary to the principles of equity upon which this
doctrine is based."''
Without going into an elaborate discussion of estoppel, Rice J.A. put his
finger on one of the most illogical aspects of the notion that promissory
estoppel cannot be used to found a cause of action, i.e. the fortuitousness
12
of who is plaintiff and who is defendant
II.Considerationand Estoppel: Analysis and Comment
The developments in recent cases are significant for the law of estoppel
in that they permit the expansion of that most expansive of estoppels,
promissory estoppel. At least in Australia, this doctrine can be taken to
have effectively swallowed up other sorts of estoppels. There is now a
Il l.

Ibid., p. 247.

112. The British Columbia Court of Appeal came close to eliminating many barriers around
estoppel in Litwin Construction (1973) Ltd. v Kiss (1988), 29 B.C.L.R. 88 (C.A.) where the
Court said:
"Under this broad principle, the distinctions between estoppel, promissory estoppel,
waiver, election, laches and acquiescence do not always affect the outcome, though they
may in some cases. The underlying concept is that of unfairness or injustice and it is not
essential to its application that there be knowledge, detriment, acquiescence or
encouragement although their presence may serve to raise the unfairness or injustice to
the level requiring the exercise of judgment. If the unfairness or injustice is very slight,
then the principle would not be applied. If it is more than slight, then the principle may
be applicable."(p.99)
This is a remarkably wide statement, the implications ofwhich the court may nothave been fully
aware. (Certainly in ComincoLtd. v CPLtd., supra,note 102, Gibbs J did not seem impressed
(p. 143), see also Beaton v Pyfrom (1991), 56 BCLR (2d) 18 (SC).) The sword/shield issue and
its malleability is touched upon in para. 81 ofKIS AIS Offshore Atlantic v Marystown Shipyard
Ltd. (1990), 87 N. & P.E.I.R. 324 (Nfld. C.A.).
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conception of estoppel as a remedy available to be of assistance where a
doctrine such as contract is unable to help, but where, without the
assistance of a court, there would be unconscionability. The desire and
willingness of a court to intervene is commendable. There is a temptation
for judges, as with anyone, to choose the status quo, to follow welltrodden paths. The recent Australian High Court decisions are perhaps
most remarkable for the fact that such a senior court is willing to make
broad and general statements about a complicated and important area of
the law.
Many of the developments in the recent cases are to be welcomed.
There is no question but that many of the limitations placed on estoppel,
and promissory estoppel in particular, are somewhat artificial. The
representation/reliance/detriment formula, if it worked well for
representations about the past and present should logically be of use when
the statements are about the future. The distinction between working as
a sword and as a shield was never satisfactory." 3 It was often assumed,
wrongly, to mean that estoppel could only be raised by a defendant.
Courts as far back as Combe v. Combe admitted an estoppel as part of a
cause of action. What was meant, therefore, by the sword/shield distinction
was that promissory estoppel could not give rise to a cause of action.
However, in a case like High Trees, there seems nothing to prevent .a
plaintiff from seeking, say, a declaration of rights based on estoppel and
that, it would seem, would be using the estoppel as a cause of action. If
it is only damages that are unavailable on the basis of estoppel, then courts
should express this result clearly and indicate (as they have not) why
damages should be so exceptional." 4 The establishment of a legal

113. This distinction goes back to Low v Bouverie. See, supra, note 43.
114. See generally on this point J. Field, "Estoppel: Shields and Swords" (1987), 11 Trent L.J.
57. Atiyah terms a "myth" the view thatestoppel is not acause ofaction: See "Misrepresentation,
Warranty and Estoppel", Ch 10, Atiyah's Essays on Contract,supra,note 20. M.A. Hickling
concludes that in many cases where promissory estoppel is employed, "To deny that estoppel

is being used as a cause of action is no more than a matter of semantics.": "Labouring with
Promissory Estoppel: A Well-Worked Doctrine Working Well?", supra, note 17, at 186. See
also K.E. Lindgren and K.G. Nicholson, "Promissory Estoppel in Australia" (1984), 58 Aust.

LJ 249. A thorough examination of the cases was made by L.A. Sheridan in "Equitable
Estoppel Today" (1952), 15 M.L.R. 325. He concluded that there was abundant evidence of

estoppel being used as a cause of action and not just as a rule of evidence. The sword/shield
distinction was criticised by Reiter in "Courts, Consideration and Common Sense", supra,note

99. Turner, however, came to the conclusion that estoppel cannot found a cause of action:
Spencer Bower and Turner, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation,supra, note 24,
p. 10 and p. 387. Turner's fear is that: "It would be impossible to allow promissory estoppel
to found a cause of action without completely revising accepted ideas on the essentials of

consideration in contract." (at p. 387) Turner does not contemplate revising the notion of
consideration.

Consideration and Estoppel: Problem and Panacea

relationship gives a party a cause of action when the terms of that legal
relationship are broken. Thus, if estoppel can create a legal relationship
(and it is disingenuous to suggest that in a case like Commonwealth of
Australia v. Verwayen it did not), it can also create a cause of action. 115
Furthermore, the distinction between a representation of law and one6
of fact has always been a difficult one to make, and, therefore, to justify.1
This distinction may be fine in theory but in practice the two are usually
combined or at least difficult to disentangle." 7 The distinction forces a
court to make invidious distinctions between similar situations. Has a
contract come into being? - Is this a question of fact or of law? Is a person
an agent? - Is this a question of fact or law? The most unconscionable
thing that could happen in such a situation is for a court to deny that it can
provide a remedy because of its determination that the question relates to
law and not fact. So, the casting off of this restraint on estoppel is to be
welcomed.
The ability of an estoppel to lead to the foundation of a contract is not
to be regretted, at least to the extent that it cures the inability of the current
law of contract to prevent unconscionable results. This role of promissory
estoppel has been recognised expressly as far back as Crabb v. Arun
DistrictCouncil," 8 but it has always been unsettling for judges because
of its seeming potential to intrude upon the central territory of contract
itself, the enforcement of obligations in the future. There is no reason
why, if contract is unable to provide assistance in a situation where the
result would otherwise be unconscionable, a doctrine such as estoppel
should not be employed to achieve the just result. The criticism this paper
makes, however, is with the need to resort to estoppel at all to achieve the
contractual result.
Finally the tearing down of some of the barriers between different sorts
of estoppels is to be welcomed. There is clearly some considerable doubt
as to whether the doctrine of estoppel should be split into separate
equitable and common law domains. The theoretical basis of all estoppels
is to prevent unfairness, or as it is usually called, unconscionability. The
use of estoppel as a tool to be resorted to when all else fails has meant that

115. On this point, David Jackson gives Low v Bouverie, supra,note 43, as another example.

2
See D. Jackson, "Estoppel as a Sword" (1965), 81 L.Q.R. 223, at p.228-2 9. He also argues

that it is difficult to appreciate how to separate the "parts" of a cause of action, (p. 239).
116. On "the ridiculous nature of the distinction between law and fact", see D. Jackson, Ibid.,
p. 224.
117. See Phipson on Evidence, 14th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), para. 1-34;
Spencer Bower and Turner on The LawRelating to EstoppelbyRepresentation,supra,note 24,

at pp. 31-43; cfE. Mureinik, "The Application of Rules: Law orFact?" (1982), 98 L.Q.R. 587.
118. Supra, note 45.
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it has had a rather haphazard growth and the result is a baffling array of
names, categories and qualifications. The judicial creativity has led to
some departure from any sense that there is a unity in estoppel. The recent
jurisprudence restores such a unity - or creates it if in fact it never
existed."19
Despite the welcome nature of many of the recent developments, the
use the courts have made of estoppel has left a number of questions and
problems. The mostobvious problem is the lack of unanimity with which
the judges have spoken. There still remains considerable confusion as to
the correct or most appropriate nomenclature to use for a particular type
of estoppel. For example, estoppel by conduct, promissory estoppel, and
equitable estoppel have all been used to mean the same thing. Only a
handful of judges, albeit very significant judges, have agreed that the
various types of estoppel are merely manifestations of the same idea.
While one's attention might be caught by and attracted to declarations
that there should be no distinction made between proprietary estoppel and
promissory estoppel or between equitable estoppel and common law
estoppel, by no means the majority of judges have expressed this view.
In fact, it is quite arguable that the new unifying statements about estoppel
only confuse the matter further.
The use of the notion of unconscionability is a ready invitation to
judicial creativity and confusion for lawyers and the public. This paper
cannot address this matter except to note that it would be an advantage if
judges using the concept did make an attempt to elucidate what they mean
by unconscionability or to state what exactly is unconscionable about the
situation with which they are dealing. 20 Unconscionability is quite likely
something judges "know when they see it", but such intuitive decisionmaking is not helpful for the development of the law. 12 1The Supreme
Court of Canada did make some attempt to address this question in the
context of exclusion clauses and fundamental breach in Hunter
EngineeringCo. Ltd. v. Syncrude CanadaLtd. 22 Dickson C.J.C. wanted

119. Most probably there never was such unity. For example, the distinct development of
promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel is set out by Spencer Bower and Turner in The
Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation,supra, note 24, pp. 306ff.
120. For a discussion of the relationship between rules and discretion, see J.A. Manwaring,
"Promissory Estoppel in the Supreme Court of Canada", supra, note 103, pp. 44-51.
121. For examples of the use of unconscionability without questioning what it means, see,
Priestley JA at p. 610 in Austotel Pty Ltd. v Franklin'sSelfserve Pty Ltd. (1989), supra,note
56. (And see Priestley JA, "A Guide to a Comparison of Australia and United States Contract
Law" (1989), 12 UNSWLJ4.) Mason Cfeared thatoveruse of theconcept ofunconscionability
could "debase" it: "Foreword" (1989), 12 U.N.S.W.L.J. 1,at p. 2.
122. (1989), 35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145 (S.C.C.).
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to replace fundamental breach with a notion that "Only where the contract
is unconscionable, as might arise from situations of unequal bargaining
power between the parties, should the courts interfere with agreements
the parties have freely concluded."' 23 Wilson J. located unconscionability
as a part of inequality of bargaining power. The judgments contemplate
unconscionability as a means to strike down something, but do not
anticipate, as the Australian cases do, the use of unconscionability as a
means to constructobligations between parties. 2 4
The erasure of the distinction between common law and equity in the
use of estoppel creates uncertainty as to whether what is left is like a
common law or like an equitable doctrine. To obliterate it without stating
how and in what context the new unified doctrine is to operate is to invite
confusion. Furthermore some judges, in particular Deane J, see no need
for the distinction between an evidentiary and a substantive role for
estoppel. There is a large body of jurisprudence based on just this
distinction and quite frankly it is not adequately dealt with by Deane J.'25
Similarly, the extent to which estoppel can create obligations - i.e. the
extent to which estoppel affects substantive law - is not satisfactorily or
consistently dealt with in the judgments. If proprietary estoppel and
promissory estoppel are really not distinct principles, then how is it that.
proprietary estoppel was able to give rise to rights (and, therefore,
obligations) where none existed previously, but under the new unified
doctrine of estoppel it cannot replace contract?
Many of these criticisms of the new learning on estoppel are criticisms
that will pass with time. In the course of years, courts will elaborate on
unconscionability. The effect of an obliteration of the distinction between
common law and equitable estoppel and between an estoppel that
operates in an evidentiary role as opposed to a substantive role will
become clearer. What will become much more difficult to establish,
based on what the judges have said to date on the matter, is the

123. Ibid., pp. 171-172.
124. An elaborate examination of unconscionability in the context of the UCC and in equity
is to be found in Leff's "Unconscionability and the Code", supra,note 6. Regarding the equity
unconscionability doctrine, Leffconcludes that there are two separate social policies embodied
therein:
"The first is that bargaining naughtiness, once it reaches a certain level, ought to avail
the practitioner naught. The second is directed not against bargaining conduct (except
insofar as certain results often are strong evidence of certain conduct otherwise
unproved) but against results, and embodies the doctrine ...that the infliction of serious
hardship demands special justification." (p. 539)
The Supreme Court of Canada approach deals with the second social policy but not the first.
125. This line of authority goes back to Low v Bouverie, supra, note 43. See Spencer Bower
7
and Turner on The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation,supra,note 24, at p. .
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relationship between estoppel and the establishment of obligations. The
problems are those that arise by virtue of the interaction and overlapping
of estoppel and the law of contract, in particular the doctrine of
consideration.
When considering the recent cases that have given rise to the new
learning on estoppel it is important to keep in mind what the courts were
trying to achieve in employing estoppel as they did. In all cases the courts
wished to impose a binding obligation for the future on the party who was
estopped. Why was it that the courts did not use the legal device most
closely associated with the imposition of such obligations, namely
contract? 6 In Waltons, the form of the contract had not been met. In
Foran and Verwayen, there was a bare promise or assertion without
anything being given in exchange to enforce it.
Why would one wish to use contract if, as the recent cases show,
estoppel can be moulded to deal with the issues raised in the cases?
Estoppel, with all its manifestations, proves to be abundantly adaptable
to meet the demands of the parties who go before the court. Although the
specific factual results produced by estoppel may be unproblematic, they
are achieved only by augmenting the scope of the already overtaxed
doctrine of estoppel and by refusing to consider the possibility that tthe
law of contract could be adapted to deal with the situations.
In all of the cases discussed in this paper where estoppel was used, what
the court sought to do was to impose an obligation. In many cases this
result would have been more satisfactorily accomplished by means of a
contract. The availability of contract would have meant that the various
contractual remedies would have been at the disposal of the court and the
parties. These remedies are flexible, adaptable and relatively certain. In
addition to the remedial advantages that contract offers, there is the vast
body of law dealing with the composition of the contract, including what
terms can be implied, what the effect of various defects are and such
things as capacity, frustration and illegality. It is true that estoppel is not
necessarily without these devices to regulate or govern the scope of the
rights of the parties. The difficulty with estoppel is that many of these
limiting or governing devices must come under the rubric of
unconscionability. There is not the advantage of the more certain and

126. That estoppel and contract may have had different historical origins, as argued by Kirby

P, in Austotel PtyLtd v Franklin'sSelfserve PtyLtd., supra,note 56, p. 58 4 , is, in my opinion,
irrelevant to their relationship today.

Consideration and Estoppel: Problem and Panacea

venerable learning to be had in the law of contract. 127 Estoppel has the
further disadvantage of being forced to perform many roles. It is this
situation that has given rise to the uncertainty as to the extent to which
estoppel can be used to create obligations. If estoppel is used by courts
because of a fear of muddying the law of contract then it is rather odd to
achieve that result by complicating further one of the least clear and overused doctrines, that of estoppel.
It is possible to adapt contract to meet the needs of many cases that have
used estoppel 2 1 The obstacle to the formation of a contract is consideration.
The other elements of the formation of the contract can easily be met; they
are often rather cavalierly dealt with by the courts'2 9 In Waltons Stores,
for example, it would have been relatively easy to have found an offer and
acceptance and intention to create legal relations. Similarly in Verwayen,
there would have been no problem finding intention to create legal
relations. There might have been a problem finding offer and acceptance,
but surely no more than in a vending machine case, for example. The
problem is the view of the court that nothing was given in exchange for
the promise. Its absence in the estoppel cases means that courts do not
even consider "making" a contract for the parties rather than using
estoppel as a tool to achieve their desired result.
The recent developments in estoppel ought to be used as an opportunity
to re-examine the doctrine of consideration. 1"OIt is the rigid requirement
in contract and serves to prevent the achievement of a contract, with all
its certainty and flexibility. Courts ought to return to the original conception
of consideration, as simply a moraljustificationfor finding the existence
of an obligation between parties, that obligation being called a contract.

127. M.P. Thompson argues that certainty must exist in contract but is inessential in equitable
estoppel because of the differing remedies, those of estoppel being flexible and those of
contract (damages and specific performance) being fixed. ("From Representation to Expectation:
Estoppel as a Cause of Action", [1983] C.L.J. 257, at p. 276-7.) Why this is so is not explained
except in a circular argument. The remedies are fixed and therefore so must be the doctrine of
contract, but the remedies are fixed because the doctrine of contract demands it. Because

estoppel is used to lead to a contract, any certainty that exists is easily undermined. It is
submitted that Thompson seriously underestimates the potential flexibility ofcontract and its
remedies.
128. North J concluded that "An examination of the cases would seem to indicate that some

of the decisions which appear to have been grounded on estoppel could have been supported
in contract." Buckland v Commissionerof Stamp Duties, [1954] N.Z.L.R. 1194, at p. 1204.
129. Indeed it is arguable that consideration is similarly dealt with when it suits the purposes
of the courts.

130. The writer disagrees with the simple statement that estoppel and consideration are simply
different. There is no proof of this. E.g. K. Lindgren, "Estoppel in Contract", supra,note 23,
p. 172.
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If it is just that there be a binding obligation between parties then there is
a reason for enforcing that relationship; consideringthat reason, a court
should enforce the relationship or the obligation., That is the consideration
for the action of the court. This consideration is no more vague and
uncertain than is the requirement of unconscionability as envisaged by
the High Court of Australia and other courts in the estoppel cases. If
someone pays money or gives a thing or makes a promise in exchange for
my goods or promise then it is unconscionable that I not be held to the
expectation created in the other person or the detriment suffered by him
or her. It is the existence of that state of affairs that is called the
consideration in a contract. The benefit given or the detriment suffered is
what would make it unconscionable for the existence of the obligation not
to be recognised. There is no reason that the unconscionability that has
founded an estoppel cannot be the unconscionability that can found
consideration for a contract. This result will indeed take the law back in
some way to the vision that Simpson saw historically in consideration, a
vision of a moral element in contract. 132This moralelement is now known
by the name ofunconscionability or unconscientiousness. 33 The intrusion
of such value-laden ideas into contract is not new. In fact, it is arguable
that consideration is the only aspect of the law of contract which is
superficially inhospitable to these moralistic ideas.134 Furthermore, if it is
argued that the proposed idea of consideration would be entirely too
artificial, then such critics should consider carefully all the other
artificialities in the law of contract. The implication of terms and, indeed,

131. It is this important role of consideration that requires that the requirement of consideration
not simply be ejected from contract law, as suggested by some. E.g. J. Carter, "Contract,
Restitution and Promissory Estoppel", supra, note 21, p. 41.
132. M. Spence writes: "Just as the availability of discretionary relief against unconscionable
agreements has not meant that judges have been prepared to undo large numbers of existing

contracts, so itmay be unlikely thattheavailabilityof discretionary reliefagainst unconscionable
conduct in promising will undermine the doctrine of consideration.": "Estoppel and Limitation",

supra,note 57, p. 227. Given the recent developments in estoppel, US jurisprudence on s. 90
of the Restatement should be of assistance in determining when to find a contract based on

"estoppel": See Priestley JA, "A Guide to a Comparison of Australian and United States
Contract Law", supra,note 121, p. 26.

133. This approach is consistent, it is submitted, with P.S. Atiyah's view that: "It now seems
to me to be more accurate to suggest that consideration really was and is a reason for the
recognition of an obligation, rather than the reason for the enforcement of a promise." at p. 183
of "Consideration: A Restatement", Ch. 8 of Essays on Contract,supra, note 20. The key is
recognition by an outside agency, the law, of a relationship, rather than the act of the parties,
a promise. See also P.S. Atiyah, An Introductionto the Law of Contract,4th ed., supra, note
22, pp. 157-160.

134. Cf. the situation with the doctrines of privity, intention to create legal relations, illegality,
misrepresentation and exclusion clauses, all of which are to some extent overtly moralistic.
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the implication of whole contracts is the most obvious example.'35 Why
is it acceptable to achieve such artificial results by using estoppel, but not
by using contract itself, which is in fact the desired reult of many parties
when the courts employ estoppel? The true artificiality is in using
estoppel, an already overburdened idea, when it is a contract that is
desired by the courts and the parties. Further the use of estoppel precludes
the combination of certainty and flexibility available when it is a contract
that is desired. 3 6The amorphousness of estoppel is hardly desirable - and
is infinitely more artificial than the proposed conception of consideration.
There is no need to await legislative reform; the means to achieve the
reform advocated here are all presently at the disposal of the courts.
The proposed notion of consideration would have other beneficial
effects as well. First it would give a basis for saying that the courts are not
to be concerned with the value of consideration. This would not be
because of any faith in the sturdy individuality of the parties, but because
a reason for enforcing an obligation does not need a particular monetary
value. On the other hand if there were no good reason why a promise or
expectation should not be enforced, then a court could find no consideration,
whatever the value of what had been given in exchange.' 37 Parties who
made it clear that they were not to be bound to their obligations could have

135. Implication can be by statute (e.g. the Sale of Goods Acts). The implication can be of a
whole contract (e.g. New ZealandShipping Co. v A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd., [1975] A.C.
154 (P.C.) ("The Eurymedon"); London Drugs Ltd. v Kuehne & Nagel InternationalLtd.,
[1990] 4 W.W.R. 289 (B.C.C.A.)(leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxviii)).
(On London Drugs, see Comment by Joost Blom in (1991), 70 Can. Bar Rev. 156.) The
implication can be of terms in a contract, by virtue of the common law. (See CP Hotels Ltd.
v Bank of Montreal (1987), 40 DLR (4th) 389.)
136. The use of estoppel ideas directly to create contracts, bypassing consideration, is done in
the US - by virtue of laws modelled on s. 90 of the Restatement.
137. There would be no need for judges like Handley JA to have to make arguments like the
following, which he acknowledged seemed "strange":
"While a single peppercorn may constitute valuable consideration which can support
a simple contract it seems to me that the loss of such an item would not constitute a
'material detriment', 'material disadvantage' or a 'significant disadvantage' for the
purposes of the law of estoppel. It may seem strange that there should be such a
distinction. However in the first case the consideration has been accepted as the price
of a bargain which the law strives to uphold. Promissory estoppels and estoppels by
representation lack this element of mutuality, and the relevant detriment has not been
accepted by the party estopped as the price for binding himself to the representation or
promise."
Hawker PacificPry. Ltd. v HelicopterCharterPry. Ltd., supra,note 10, at pp. 307-308.
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that desire respected.'38 Secondly the old problem of past consideration
would be considerably reduced. It would no longer be sufficient to say
that the fact that the consideration was past was in itself sufficient to
preclude an enforcement of the promise. It might be or it might not be. In
139
some cases a right created by estoppel can be terminated on notice.
There is no reason why an obligation created by contract cannot do the
same thing; in fact many contracts, especially service contracts, do.
The revision to our ideas about consideration would also lead to
questioning about the law of contract. T. Brett~l Dawson has written: "In
estoppel cases, judges have simultaneously accepted that the theoretical
framework of classical contract law is the legitimate and applicable law,
and proceeded to circumvent its application. This has created a cycle of
indirect response in situations which diverge from the 'classical model'
of contracting."'n 0 As set out earlier, contract is seen as a thing builtby the
parties. One of the elements that the parties have to provide to this
construction is consideration. A better view of contract is simply as the
legal recognition of a relationship of obligation between parties. The
parties choose to some extent to be in the relationship and to have that
relationship affect their future rights and obligations. It could involve
two, three or countless parties. It is wrong to purport that the partiesdo
all or most of the construction. Much of the relationship is constructed for
the parties by the common law or by the legislature - the parties are free
only at the outset, to some extent, to choose not to have anything to do
with each other. Once'they choose (and it could be as a result of something
accidental as in Verwayen) to have some sort of connection for the future,
then a contract can come into existence. This, a contract, is better seen as
an acknowledgement of a present or future obligation-filled relationship
rather than as a thing which the parties have of their own free will
created. 141
This conception of consideration and contract does invite considerable
judicial intervention, but not much more than is presently the case. It
certainly leads to greater certainty for the parties if they can use the
vehicle of a contract rather than the entirely unpredictable vehicle of

138. E.g. as in Austotel Pty Ltd. v Franklin'sSelfserve Pty Ltd., supra, note 56, p. 620 per
Rogers A-JA.
139. E.g. CentralLondon PropertyTrustsLtd. v High Trees House Ltd., supra,note 35; Tool
MetalManufacturingCo. Ltd. v Tungsten ElectricCo.Ltd., [1955] 1W.L.R. 761 (H.L.). M.P.
Thompson discusses the difference between pre-breach and post-breach representations in
"From Representation to Expectation: Estoppel as a Cause of Action", supra,note 127, p. 2 6 3 .

140. In "Estoppel and Obligation: the modem role ofestoppel by convention", supra,note 25,
p. 19.
141. Cf. the approach of Leff in "Contract as Thing", supra,note 7.
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estoppel. It does involve some uncertainty in the use of the ill-defined
notion of unconscionability. But this notion is well established in contract
anyway and appears to be the instrument of choice in the new cases on
estoppel. The use of unconscionability proposed here does not mean the
ouster of consideration as we know it. Rather it involves a reconsideration
of the current elements that can constitute consideration and an expansion
of them to include the situations in the estoppel cases. In the area of
constitutional theory, Joel Bakan has argued that there are two (main)
types of legitimisation argument - "the one based on constraintby the
constitution, the other on trust in judicial interest balancing".14 2 The first
type of argument sets out constraints upon judges to reach legally correct
answers. Judges may not substitute their own policy choices and
preferences for those of elected officials. The second argument accords
considerable discretion to the judiciary. Judges are trusted to balance
competing interests and consider the probable consequences of deciding
one way or the other. 143 The discussion in most contract and consideration
cases to date accepts the first argument of the role of judges.This results
in a rigid application of accepted structures to determine when obligations
have been created by contract (and by the parties). This paper argues that,
despite that ostensible acceptance of the first argument, what judges have
tried to do in fact is to derive a successful conclusion or balancing of
interests by manipulating and distinguishing accepted rules. They have in
fact used the second model of the role of the judiciary.'" In the recent
Australian cases discussed in this article, the courts have concluded that
a particular result is necessary and have manipulated the tools ofestoppel
to arrive at the contract result they desired, all the while distinguishing
their efforts from an assault on orthodoxy. Far preferable would it be to
accept what Duncan Kennedy has called a paternalistic motive for the
judiciary in contract law. "
The overt acceptance of whatjudges in fact do in cases like those under
consideration here would be a better way to establish some sort of
principled determination of when it is that courts ought to recognise a
contract as existing between parties. "Covert tools are never reliable

142. J.C. Bakan, "Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in Canadian
Constitutional Thought" (1989), 27 Osgoode Hall W. 123, at p.126.
143. Bakan goes on to discuss a middle ground in the constitutional area.

144. Some judges have been somewhat more candid about their role. E.g. Lord Denning M.R.
in George Mitchell Ltd. v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd., [ 1983] 1 Q.B. 284.

145. D. Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law", supra,
note 6. See also D. Kennedy, "Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology" (1986), 36 J.Legal Educ. 518.
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tools."' 46 The first important step is to acknowledge that contracts are not
simply built by parties but are judicial responses to a situation requiring
a balancing of conflicting claims and interests. As Wilson J. suggests in
HunterEngineering,147 in the absence of inequality of bargaining power,
the parties involved may well be the bestjudges of what is fair as between
themselves. In those cases the task of the judge will simply be to
determine what that construction of the parties is and approve it. But, in
other cases, the judge will supply in whole or in part the resolution as to
what is fair as between the parties, probably taking into account broader
social issues. This overt role does place considerable trust in the ability
of the judiciary to accomplish satisfactorily the balancing of these
interests and obviously leaves room for personal prejudices of judges.
Suffice it to argue in response that an alternative will not make these
prejudices disappear, but will merely force them once again to be
disguised or ignored.
Such a reworking of consideration and the law of contract, as proposed
here, could have implications for other areas of the law. The one that
comes first to mind is fiduciary relations where Canadian courts have
been active in the way that Australian courts have been active in the area
of estoppel. 14 1 It might well be worthwhile to investigate whether the
recent Canadian cases on fiduciary duties would benefit by a new vision
of contract rather than by use of the drastic "remedy" of imposition of a
fiduciary duty. It would certainly prevent making fiduciary duty a workhorse like estoppel has become, thereby debasing it and spoiling it for
those situations where it is truly vital. The fictions in restitution, such as
"acceptance" and "incontrovertible benefit" would be needed less or
eliminated altogether. 14

146. Per K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1960), quoted by Leff at p. 559 in "Unconscionability and the Code", supra, note 6.
147. Supra, note 122, at p. 207.
148. E.g. StandardInvestmentsLtd. v CIBC (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 410 (Ont. C.A.); Guerin
v The Queen (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.). See also Lac Mineralsv International

CoronaResources (1989), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14 (S.C.C.); Frame v Smith (1987), 42D.L.R. (4th)
81, per Wilson J at 97-98; J.C. Shepherd, The Law ofFiduciaries,supra, note 21; P.D. Finn,
FiduciaryObligations,supra,note 21; Meagher, Gummow andLehane, Equity:Doctrinesand
Remedies, ch. 5, supra,note 21; Paul Finn, "Contract and the Fiduciary Principle", supra,note
21.
149. See J. Carter, "Contract, Restitution, and Promissory Estoppel", supra, note 21, p. 45.
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The other effect of the suggested approach to consideration is that it
would reduce the role of estoppel and confine it to more of an evidentiary
function.' It can only be beneficial to give estoppel a more precise and
discrete role. The writer is unable at this point to see for estoppel a
substantive role that could not be played by the proposed vision of
consideration and contract. Estoppel could retreat to the function that
estoppel by representation has historically played. The role of promissory
estoppel and proprietary estoppel could be replaced by the true work
horse of future obligations, namely contract.

150. Atiyah would seem to go further and obliterate any distinction between estoppel and
contract. See p. 2 30 of "Consideration: A Restatement", Ch. 8 of Essays on Contract,supra,
note 20. According to Atiyah, estoppel is no more a rule of evidence than is the so-called
"irrebuttable presumption". (p. 310 of "Misrepresentation, Warranty and Estoppel", ch. 10 of
Essays on Contract, ibid.).

